

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 25

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Volume II

The International Week

The Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned after agreeing in principle on an Austrian Treaty but failing to achieve more than a modus vivendi on Germany. The UN Commission for Indonesia noted progress toward restoration of the Republic to Jogjakarta while in the Kashmir case, India became more conciliatory regarding truce terms. However, at Lausanne, the Palestine peace talks were on the point of breaking down. The UN Human Rights Commission completed a draft human rights covenant. At its Luxembourg meeting, the Western Union Consultative Council discussed defense matters. The Food and Agriculture Organization announced the dissolution of the International Emergency Food Committee, which allocates foodstuffs in short supply.

SUGAR COATED DEADLOCK

Although the CFM accomplished almost nothing toward final settlement of the German problem, it has had the effect of lessening the cold war tension by demonstrating that the USSR is still anxious to negotiate with the West. After protracted failure to settle on any formula for reuniting either Germany or Berlin, the USSR and the Western Powers agreed on a loose and inconclusive modus vivendi relating to East-West German trade and access to the capital. It registered important progress toward an Austrian treaty, agreement being reached on the 1938 Austrian frontiers and on the sum to be paid the USSR for releasing certain former German assets in its zone.

Soviet reluctance to make more definite commitments at Paris is rendered a mystery by the apparent eagerness of the USSR to resume the CFM talks last spring. It then appeared that the Kremlin was bent upon delaying the formation of a West German state, retarding the consolidation of Western resistance to Soviet expansionism and reopening the blocked channels of East-West trade. By the time the CFM actually convened, however, the USSR seemed hesitant to make any firm commitments on Germany, or to relax its grasp on Eastern Germany and Berlin. Some explanation may be found in: (1) the rude jolt to the USSR from the Eastern German elections; (2) Satellite fear of any Soviet concessions to German nationalism; and (3) growing signs of an approaching US recession which had become more pronounced between the time when the CFM meeting was first broached and

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
the session's opening. Moscow may well have detected these economic storm signals and concluded that the approaching Western depression might at last present it with some long sought opportunities. To leave itself free to exploit this situation, the USSR may have pursued an ambiguous objective at Paris in somewhat reducing East-West political tensions while avoiding any hard and fast commitments pending further clarification and development of the economic picture. The Politburo may anticipate the following effects of a deepening depression: (1) increased difficulty in persuading an economy-minded US Congress to provide needed financial support to the ERP and the Military Aid Program; (2) aggravated economic cleavages between the US and UK, already manifest respecting the Anglo-Argentine Trade Agreement; (3) diminishing US ability to induce Western European countries to uphold the policy of trade restrictions against Eastern Europe, particularly if potential Eastern European markets could ease growing unemployment in the West; and (4) increasing distress and discontent in Western Germany where a "plague on both your houses" attitude is already beginning to display itself.

In the above context it was logical for the USSR to seek some detente preventing the CFM from disbanding without a slight appearance of progress made. Any too brusque reaction to the West at the Palais Rose might have led to further intensification of Western rearmament, producing an artificial boom which would, in Soviet eyes, help stave off depression. Thus the USSR apparently endeavored to create the illusion that East-West negotiations were progressing, meanwhile depending on a depression to realize some Soviet objectives which earlier USSR tactics had failed to bring about. A wait and see policy would better answer Soviet aims than resort to truculence which could arouse somnolent Western legislatures already preoccupied with domestic economic troubles. This reasoning may have led the USSR to make its substantial concessions on the Austrian treaty -- the least significant agenda item, where indeed it has exacted handsome indemnities for its scuttling of Tito's claims.

Austria aside, the chief result of the Conference has been to formalize and prolong the partition of Germany, while achieving some normalization of the East-West split. This continued deadlock arose from the reluctance of either side to risk revival of a unified Reich at this time on terms which might favor the other. Neither side thus feels itself free as yet to alter the present transitional arrangements. The Western Powers seek to maintain their control over Trienza, not merely to prevent its coming under Soviet domination but, especially on the part of France, to forestall any resurgence of German militarism. The USSR, on the other hand, apparently allowed its fear lest freely expressed German nationalism assume an anti-Soviet orientation to outweigh for the time being its long term hope of someday making common cause with Germany against the West. Consequently the larger effect of the CFM session had been merely to

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postpone the solution of the German problem, while reviving the machinery through which any future settlement might be reached.



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WFTU to stress Asian labor plans and "trade departments" at Milan. The Milan Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions, opening 28 June, may be expected to reiterate current Communist emphasis on "working class unity" and the "defense of peace", but will probably turn its major efforts to plans for increasing WFTU influence in the Far East and Southeast Asia and for minimizing losses in Europe and the Western hemisphere.

The WFTU organizing drive in Asia, temporarily stalled, is now likely to be accelerated as the Federation moves to counteract last week's decision by eight Middle and Far Eastern labor delegations at the ILO Geneva session (Turkey, Japan, China, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia) to form a non-Communist Asian Labor Federation. Designation of a 30-man Chinese labor delegation to the Milan Congress reflects the significance which WFTU leaders attach to this drive as well as the key role which is apparently assigned to Chinese Communist labor leaders. However, the absence

of Indian and Japanese representatives will weaken the impression of WFTU strength in this area, while still other Asian countries may be unrepresented, owing to lack of visa and foreign exchange facilities. Nevertheless, the WFTU will probably proceed with plans for a Pan-Asiatic Labor Conference in Peiping where it hopes to assemble a wide Asian labor representation this fall.

In the West, the WFTU will direct its energies to combatting preparations of the Western coalition of free trade unions for a new labor international. To meet this challenge it probably will: (1) increase its efforts to launch a substantial number of WFTU "trade departments" by August 1949: metal workers, textile and clothing workers, miners, leather workers, seamen, building trade workers and teachers; (2) direct particular attention to Western colonies where it charges "mass repression" of labor is practiced; and (3) unleash a propaganda barrage against the Western labor organizations designed to tag them as "blackleg" unions controlled by capitalist governments.

Another step toward Libyan unity. Sayid Idriss al Senussi has indicated to a Tripolitanian delegation his willingness to rule a united Libya and the terms under which he would support Tripolitanian unity aspirations. The Emir warned, however, that either the return to Tripolitania of the anti-Senussi spokesman Eshir Saadawi or confirmation of Italian trusteeship over the area would void his promise. Moreover, the problem of the hereditary dynasty (on which Saadawi always based his opposition to federation under Senussi leadership) still remains. Meanwhile, a unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Tripolitanian leaders is a possibility in the next few months, as a result of growing sentiment for independence spurred by the Cyrenaican example.

The UK also remains undecided as to supporting unity or opposing it. Supporting it would appease the Arabs although involving the UK in commitments on Tripolitania which it has assiduously sought to avoid; opposing it would appease France and Italy. The French remain firm in their opposition to an adjacent independent Arab state which would increase native French North African aspirations. The Italians, if unable to get a trusteeship over Tripolitania, might support an independent Libya, provided sufficient guarantees were given for Italian interests in Tripolitania.

USSR may alter rigid stand on UN membership. During Security Council review of UN membership applications the Soviet attitude toward the admission of new states to the UN may change, as a result of the USSR's more conciliatory attitude toward the West. Although

desirous of gaining a proportionate increase in UN membership by the simultaneous acceptance of its Satellites -- Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Rumania -- the USSR may decide to admit one or two states, for example Italy, in an effort further to appreciate its currency in its present "peace" offensive. The propaganda advantage in Italy of such a move would be great and the Soviet veto of Italy is based on grounds easier to abandon (simultaneous admission of all the ex-enemy states) than are other Soviet vetoes. Finland, too, is an ex-enemy state. By approving the admission of these two nations, the USSR could point up its generosity while criticizing Western violation of the Potsdam Agreement (as interpreted by the Soviets) in refusing to admit Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.

IOG NOTES

Demand for international tin agreement. Foreseeing an imminent surplus in world tin production, most major exporting countries in the Tin Study Group strongly favor calling a UN conference as soon as possible to negotiate a tin agreement. The UK demands this move, the Dutch remain neutral and the US, which still questions whether a real surplus is yet in the making, is opposed. This development is indicative of a trend, exemplified by the International Wheat Agreement, toward meeting the problem created by a return to surplus conditions in major raw material markets by regulation through intergovernmental commodity agreements.

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A Czechoslovakian Mindszenty case. The Czech Government's current assaults upon the Catholic Church and Archbishop Beran closely parallel the similar attacks in Hungary which culminated in the conviction of Cardinal Mindszenty. There is an important distinction, however; Hungary under its peace treaty, made specific promises to the US and UK respecting freedom of worship, promises absent in the case of "liberated" Czechoslovakia.

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"This is where we came in." The three year struggle to devise acceptable international controls for atomic energy has ended just where it started -- in the laps of the six sponsors of the 1946 UN resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission -- the Big Five and Canada. The AEC Working Committee, after weeks of futile debate, turned down the Soviet proposal to the 1948 GA for two simultaneous treaties, one banning the atomic bomb immediately and the other setting up controls, and resolved that further study of the issue would be futile until the six countries could agree. The USSR wants control subject to, and the West wants it free from, the veto. The USSR also rejects the principle of an international atomic energy authority. The chances for agreement are remote.

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New proposals for UN guard. The Secretary General has revamped his proposals for a UN guard so as to call for a UN field service of 300 men with a 2,000 man reserve panel. The USSR will probably continue to oppose any guard proposal, however labelled. Nevertheless the GA could authorize such a force over Soviet objections.

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